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Abstract: 
The design of government portfolios, i.e. the distribution of competencies among 
government ministries and office holders, constitutes a largely ignored aspect of 
executive and coalition politics. In this article, we argue that portfolio design is a 
substantively and theoretically relevant phenomenon with major implications for the 
study of institutional design and coalition politics. Based on comparative data on 
portfolio design reforms in nine Western European countries since the 1970s, we show 
how the design of government portfolios changes over time. Specifically, we show that 
portfolio design is changed frequently (on average about once a year) and that these 
reforms are more likely after changes in the prime ministership and the party 
composition of the government. Our findings suggest a political logic behind these 
reforms based on the preferences and power of political parties and politicians. They 
have major implications for the study of institutional design and coalition politics. 
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1. Introduction  
The formation of a new cabinet involves many decisions: Which parties form the 
cabinet? Which parties and individuals get to control which ministry? And what policy 
program does the cabinet agree upon? While these questions have been at the centre 
of scholarly attention for decades (for reviews see e.g. Laver 1998; Laver and 
Schofield 1990; Müller 2009), another crucial decision has been largely overlooked 
by political science research: How are government ministries designed, i.e. which 
ministries and office holders are in charge of what policy areas? While coalition 
researchers usually treat ministries as exogenous payoffs to be distributed, this article 
casts serious doubt on this assumption by showing that the makeup of ministries is 
often reformed in the context of coalition formation. 
A few examples illustrate that the design of government portfolios is sometimes 
changed drastically. In 2016, the incoming British Prime Minister Theresa May 
created a new Department for Exiting the European Union charged with managing the 
Brexit process. In 2010, the Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán reduced the 
number of ministries from fourteen to eight creating some ministries with extensive 
jurisdictions, e.g. a Department of Finance and Economics. Below the level of such 
comprehensive reforms involving the creation and termination of entire ministries, 
individual competencies are frequently shifted between existing ministries. For 
example, the jurisdictions for energy, consumer protection, urban development, and 
digital infrastructure were reassigned to new ministries at the beginning of the third 
German cabinet headed by Angela Merkel in 2013. 
This manuscript introduces a comparative research project that systematically studies 
such reforms of portfolio design across nine Western European democracies. We 
define portfolio design as the distribution of competencies among government 
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ministries and office holders (i.e. ministers and junior ministers). The manuscript 
argues that such reforms are substantively relevant phenomena that should affect 
policy-making and policy outputs and are theoretically important for various strands 
of political science research, most importantly the literatures on deliberate institutional 
design and coalition research. We discuss the scarce existing literature and argue that 
a systematic study of portfolio design should take a comparative approach without 
neglecting in-depth expertise of individual countries.  
Towards this end, we introduce a new comparative dataset covering portfolio design 
changes in nine Western European democracies since 1970. Based on these data, the 
article investigates two fundamental research questions: first, how frequent are 
changes in portfolio design and thus how realistic is the assumption of ministries as 
exogenous payoffs that is central for the literature on portfolio allocation (e.g. Bäck et 
al. 2011; Laver and Shepsle 1996, 49)? Second, can political events related to changes 
in the government explain the timing of portfolio design reforms, which would suggest 
that such reforms are an integral part of the government formation process? Our 
empirical analysis first demonstrates that reforms occur frequently, on average roughly 
once a year. Furthermore, changes in portfolio design are much more likely after 
changes in the party composition of the cabinet and the person of the prime minister, 
whereas changes in the cabinet’ ideological position and in the relative size of cabinet 
parties yield only weak additional effects. These findings suggest that portfolio design 
is indeed driven by a political logic and can be considered a distinct strategy that 
government parties employ to adapt the distribution of competencies to their 
advantage. We point to several implications of these findings for the general literature 
on institutional design and for coalition research in the concluding section.  
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2. Why study portfolio design? 
Thus far, the design of cabinet portfolios has received little scholarly attention. This 
omission is surprising given the central role that ministries play in modern 
democracies. In this section, we outline three reasons for studying the politics of 
portfolio design: (1) the substantive importance of ministries in policy-making, (2) the 
theoretical relevance of deliberate institutional reform as a strategy of political actors, 
and (3) the theoretical and methodological relevance of the changes in portfolio design 
for the study of coalition politics. 
First, portfolio design should affect government policy because ministries play a 
dominant role in the policy-making process. Ministries enjoy ample leeway in the 
drafting stage of new legislation and its subsequent implementation (e.g. Andeweg 
2000; Huber and Shipan 2002; Knill and Tosun 2012; Laver and Shepsle 1994; Peters 
2010; Schnapp 2004). Even though individual ministries are constrained (to varying 
degrees) by collective decision-making in the cabinet and central coordination by the 
prime minister (Dahlström et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2000; Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995), 
there is little doubt that ministries are crucial for everyday decisions and also enjoy 
disproportionate influence on major policy decisions within their jurisdiction (Laver 
and Shepsle 1994; Müller 1994). Accordingly, changes in the design of portfolios, 
especially the reallocation of jurisdictions from one ministry to another, should affect 
policy-making.  
This effect is independent of what position one takes on the much-disputed question 
of how strong the political leadership, i.e. the minister, is able to steer policy within 
her department. If minsters are strong, they can put their own stamp on policy decisions 
so that changes in portfolio design should affect policymaking due to the impact of 
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individual ministers, especially if jurisdictions are shifted between ministries 
controlled by different parties. If, on the other hand, policymaking is dominated by the 
ministerial bureaucracy, differences in the preferences of bureaucrats, established links 
to policy networks and interest groups, as well as ministry-specific ways of framing 
problems and possible solutions should lead bureaucrats in different ministries to 
perceive and address policy problems differently (e.g. Sabatier and Weible 2007; 
Scharpf 1997, 39–40; Smeddinck and Tils 2002, 262–66). This effect should be 
particularly visible if policy decisions have to balance conflicting goals. For example, 
energy policy involves a fundamental trade-off between economic prerogatives and 
environmental concerns. It is plausible to expect that this trade-off will be addressed 
differently depending on whether energy policy is drafted in a ministry of economics 
or a ministry of the environment.  
Beyond the expected policy impact, changes in portfolio design are often symbolic 
political events that are used to signal specific issue emphasis of the government 
(Derlien 1996; Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015). Examples include the creation 
of super-ministries such as the Ministry for Economics and Labour in Germany in 
2002, the creation of the Department for Exiting the European Union (‘Ministry for 
Brexit’) in Britain in 2016, and the establishment of environmental ministries in many 
countries in the 1980s. Both the influence of ministries on policymaking and the 
political signalling effect make reforms of portfolio design substantively relevant 
phenomena. 
Second, reforms of portfolio design constitute a distinct, but thus far largely ignored 
strategy that political actors can use in pursuit of their substantive interests. Rational 
choice institutionalist research, in particular, claims that actors reform institutional 
rules if they expect a different institutional setup to be more suitable for reaching their 
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substantive goals (e.g. Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003; Ostrom 2005; Tsebelis 1990, Ch. 
4). Empirical research found support for this claim in the design of electoral system 
(e.g. Benoit 2004, 2007; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Renwick 2011; Vowles 1995), 
parliamentary organization (e.g. André et al. 2016; Binder 1996; Dion 1997; Schickler 
2000; Sieberer and Müller 2015; Zubek 2015), and political regime types (Cheibub 
2007; Przeworski 1992). Surprisingly, however, there is very little empirical research 
on the internal organization of the executive branch that tests whether these theoretical 
arguments are also valid for the distribution of competencies between ministries. 
Given the substantive importance of ministries, this question is essential for a general 
understanding of institutional reform as a deliberate strategy of political actors in 
parliamentary democracies. 
Third, portfolio design is directly relevant for the study of coalition politics because it 
challenges the standard assumption that ministries are exogenous payoffs to be 
distributed in coalition formation and because it points to an additional mechanism for 
mutual control within the cabinet. Coalition research treats ministerial positions as key 
payoffs in the coalition formation game, either for the office benefits they entail or for 
the influence they provide on policy (Druckman and Warwick 2005; Laver and 
Schofield 1990; Raabe and Linhart 2014). Thus, an established strand of research 
analyses the allocation of ministries between coalition partners, both with regard to the 
quantitative allocation and to the question of which specific ministries are assigned to 
which party (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Carroll and Cox 2007; Ecker et al. 2015; Falcó-
Gimeno and Indridason 2013; Laver 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Raabe and 
Linhart 2015; Verzichelli 2008; Warwick and Druckman 2006).  
This research usually assumes (often implicitly) that portfolios are fixed and that their 
design is exogenous to the allocation process. One justification for this assumption is 
  8 
the need to hold some aspects constant in order to increase the traceability of the 
assignment process, especially for modelling purposes (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 49–
50). While this argument is methodologically valid, it can be problematic if political 
actors frequently and deliberately alter the makeup of ministries in the allocation 
process. This would suggest that the design of government portfolios is an essential 
element of the government formation process that deserves explanation. Previously 
available data and the new empirical evidence we present below indicate that this may 
well be the case.  
Moving beyond the allocation process, the design of cabinet portfolios can also 
contribute to the literature on coalition governance (e.g. Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin 
and Vanberg 2011; Strøm et al. 2008; Thies 2001). For one, the allocation of related 
jurisdictions to different ministries controlled by different parties can be 
conceptualized as an additional mechanism by which coalition partners control each 
other and reign in ministers from other parties (Saalfeld and Schamburek 2014). 
Furthermore, portfolio design can be used to strengthen the position of the prime 
minister by creating parallel structures in the prime minister’s office to oversee 
policymaking within ministries (Fleischer 2011) or by allocating  jurisdictions to 
specific ministers in order to reduce preference heterogeneity and thus the danger of 
agency loss (Dewan and Hortala-Vallve 2011). Third, portfolio design also matters for 
the analysis of individual ministerial careers because removing or granting 
competencies can be a mechanism for prime ministers and other government leaders 
(e.g. leaders of smaller coalition partners) to punish or reward individual ministers 
(Indridason and Kam 2008). 
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3. Conceptualizing and measuring portfolio design 
Despite its substantive and theoretical importance, the politics of portfolio design is 
largely uncharted territory. Existing research mainly focused on the number of 
ministries as a rough indicator of portfolio design, both in comparative analyses (Davis 
et al. 1999; Indridason and Bowler 2014; Verzichelli 2008) and in single country 
studies (for Denmark: Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015; for Germany: Derlien 
1996; Lehnguth and Vogelgesang 1988; Saalfeld and Schamburek 2014; for the UK: 
Heppell 2011; Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Pollitt 1984; White and Dunleavy 2010). 
These studies show that cabinet size varies massively both between countries and over 
time. A brief look at a sample of 29 European democracies since 1945 (or the date of 
democratization) shows that in an average country, the number of ministers in the 
largest cabinet was almost 80 percent higher than in the smallest one. In 19 of 29 
countries, the difference was at least 50 percent, in seven even 100 percent or more. 
These differences stem from frequent changes in cabinet size: Only 37 percent of all 
cabinets in this sample contain the same number of ministers as the previous one 
whereas 28 (34) percent witness a decrease (increase) in cabinet size.1 
However, changes in cabinet size are only the tip of the iceberg and mask frequent 
shifts in jurisdictions between established ministries. Such changes have so far only 
been documented in a limited number of single-country studies. A study of Britain 
states that 125 government departments were involved in reconfigurations from 1950 
to 2009, while the net change in the number of ministries was much smaller (White 
and Dunleavy 2010, Figure 6). In Germany, 38 reforms of portfolio design between 
1957 and 2015 affected 147 ministries. Of those changes, only a small minority 
                                                          
1
 Own calculations based on data from the European Representative Democracy Data 
Archive (Andersson et al. 2014). 
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involved the creation (6) or termination (13) of a ministry whereas 128 were 
jurisdictional shifts between established ministries (Sieberer 2015). 
Such single-country studies have obvious merits for understanding the country 
analysed and can dig much deeper with regard to data collection and context specific 
explanations. However, they are inherently limited with regard to generalizability and 
compatibility with existing comparative work (especially in the area of coalition 
research). Furthermore, single country studies cannot assess the impact of institutional 
factors that are stable within countries such as second-order rules on how portfolio 
design can be reformed, the prevailing cabinet format, or the power of prime ministers 
and heads of state in the government formation (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; 
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Strøm et al. 2003). To alleviate these problems, we 
outline a cross-national design below that allows us to go beyond single countries 
while remaining attentive to crucial country-specific peculiarities with regard to data 
collection. Before, the next section develops theoretical expectations on the conditions 
under which reforms of portfolio design should occur. 
4. Explaining changes in portfolio design 
The core theoretical claim of this article holds that portfolio design reforms are driven 
by a ‘political logic’, i.e. parties and politicians change the design of government 
portfolios according to their political preferences.2 One way to test this core 
                                                          
2
 Public administration research attributes changes in portfolio design to the 
workability of the ‘machinery of government’. While empirical research on individual 
reforms finds examples where these concerns play a role (Busse 2006; Davis et al. 
1999; Derlien 1996; Heppell 2011; Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Pollitt 1984; White 
and Dunleavy 2010), even proponents concede that efficiency concerns are only one 
of many reasons for reallocating jurisdictions (Davis et al. 1999; Derlien 1996; Pollitt 
1984).  
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expectation is studying the timing of reforms.3 If portfolio design is changed for 
political reasons, reforms should cluster temporally after events that change the 
preference constellation among the relevant political actors. Changes in the cabinet are 
the most important events in this respect. However, cabinets can change in various 
ways. Distinguishing between different types of changes, we can go beyond the simple 
expectation that the preference constellation in the cabinet matters for portfolio design 
reforms and identify which changes are decisive.  
For this purpose, our analysis focuses on four events: A change in party composition, 
a change in the person of the prime minister, a change in cabinet ideology, and a 
change in the partisan fragmentation of the cabinet. The first two affect cabinets on a 
very fundamental level by exchanging at least some of the relevant actors. Thus, they 
are most likely to trigger reforms. In contrast, changes in cabinet ideology and the 
partisan fragmentation of the cabinet provide a gradual measure of the magnitude of 
changes in the cabinet. At the same time, these two measures are largely contingent on 
changes in the cabinet’s party composition, i.e. they are usually stable in the absence 
of changes in cabinet composition.4 Thus, these variables allow us to test whether the 
magnitude of changes in the cabinet yields any additional effect on portfolio design 
reform beyond the fact that the cabinet changes at all. In the empirical analysis, we 
                                                          
3
 Timing is certainly not the only way to identify a political logic in portfolio design 
reforms. More targeted analyses analyze the content and beneficiaries of reforms 
based on specific assumptions about the goals of political actors such as increasing 
their expected office and policy payoffs or controlling coalition partners by creating 
overlapping jurisdictions between ministries. We discuss these perspectives for 
future research in more detail in the concluding section. 
4
 In theory, the ideological position of the cabinet can also change without any 
alteration in cabinet parties and their sizes only due to changes in parties’ ideological 
positions. In our empirical analysis, however, this is rarely the case because we rely 
on expert survey measures of ideology that are only measured at a few time points. 
  12 
address the dependence between the different change measures by estimating models 
for single events as well as a joint model. 
First, changes in the party composition of the cabinet should make portfolio design 
reforms more likely. New cabinet parties may want to structure government portfolios 
differently than their predecessors to reflect changes in the government’s policy 
priorities, for example, by creating independent departments for policy areas that are 
high on the government’s issue agenda (Mortensen and Green-Pedersen 2015). Thus, 
we expect: 
Hypothesis 1: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the party 
composition of the government changes. 
Second, a change to a new prime minister constitutes a key event for any cabinet 
because the preferences and personality of prime ministers have strong substantive and 
symbolic impact on their cabinets.5 For example, prime ministers often differ in their 
leadership style and the way they solve conflicts within the cabinet (Helms 2005; 
Poguntke and Webb 2005; Timmermans 2003). Therefore, a new prime minister could 
aim to change portfolio design as an aspect of coalition governance to his or her liking. 
This argument is particularly strong in countries like Germany, where portfolio design 
is the prerogative of the head of government. Thus, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the Prime minister 
changes. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 focus on changes in the cabinet’s composition. In the following, 
we analyse two factors that go beyond binary reform measures and capture the 
                                                          
5
 In fact, most scholars treat changes in the prime ministership as an event that 
terminates a government (e.g. Müller and Strøm 2000). 
  13 
magnitude of change that takes place. For one, changes in portfolio design could 
depend on the ideological differences between the current cabinet and its predecessor 
(Dahlström and Holmgren 2017). Ideological shifts between cabinets are often 
associated with changes in issue positions and priorities of the cabinet parties. Parties 
might thus feel the need to change the design of government portfolios in ways that 
reflect these new priorities. For example, the new Danish centre-right coalition 
government in 2001 established an independent ministry for ‘refugees, immigrants and 
integration’ and stripped down the competencies of the ‘environment and energy’ 
department (e.g. moving ‘energy’ to the economics department). Thus, we 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the ideological 
position of the cabinet changes. 
Moreover, changes in the relative size of parties within the cabinet could have an 
additional effect on portfolio design. Ample research shows that party size is a crucial 
predictor of the distribution of office and policy payoffs within coalitions (e.g. Bäck 
et al. 2011; Warwick and Druckman 2006). Beyond a strong orientation towards 
proportionality, several studies show that small parties are slightly overpaid with 
regard to the number of portfolios (Browne and Franklin 1973; Warwick and 
Druckman 2006). One way to allocate more office to small parties is to adapt portfolio 
design, e.g. by splitting ministries or moving policy jurisdictions to ministries 
controlled by small parties (Sieberer 2015). Changes in the relative sizes of cabinet 
parties can be measured via the partisan fragmentation within the cabinet leading to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Changes in portfolio design become more likely when the fragmentation 
in the cabinet changes. 
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5. Studying portfolio design comparatively 
In this section, we outline our approach to studying portfolio design comparatively 
across nine Western European democracies. While our conceptual definition of 
portfolio design and its reform is quite straightforward, measuring it empirically is a 
rather complex task that requires in-depth field knowledge to gather and correctly code 
the relevant information. For one, the power to determine portfolio design is granted 
to different actors, i.e. the head of state in some countries, the head of government in 
others, and the legislature via law-making in yet others. Second, in many instances the 
documents outlining portfolio design are not readily available but have to be identified 
via archival work, especially for earlier periods. Third, reforms include both 
substantive changes and minuscule administrative or purely technical changes (such 
as correcting typos) that are not always easy to distinguish. Finally, some ministerial 
jurisdictions are country-specific and their relevance is hard to judge without in-depth 
knowledge of the respective political system.  
To deal with these challenges, we collected data in a decentralized way as a team of 
country experts based on joint coding instructions. This strategy achieves an optimal 
balance between country-specific expertise and conceptual coherence. We analyse 
portfolio design reforms in nine West European countries over up to 45 years (from 1 
January 1970 to 31 December 2015): Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Sweden (see Table 1). This set of countries provides 
substantial variation in institutional setup and party system characteristics, e.g. 
regarding the power and role of prime ministers (Strøm et al. 2003), formal powers of 
heads of state (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), the government formation process 
(Laver and Schofield 1990, 210), the types of governments that are formed (Müller 
and Strøm 2000), and the format of the party system (Mair 2002).  
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Based on our definition of portfolio design, we code changes in portfolio design as 
instances in which the distribution of competencies among departments (ministries) 
changes or the distribution of competencies among office holders (ministers and junior 
ministers) is modified. Thus, mere cabinet reshuffles without an alternation in policy 
responsibilities are not analysed. By contrast, changes in the number of departments 
and/or office holders do constitute a change in portfolio design because new or 
discarded offices and/or office holders gain or lose competencies, respectively. In 
addition, moving officeholders (most notably junior ministers) with fixed 
competencies between departments also counts as a change in portfolio design.  As 
Table 1 indicates, the formal rules in which portfolio design is codified, and thus the 
data sources for our coding, vary across countries. The empirical analysis below 
controls for these differences. 
Table 1: Countries, sources for changes in portfolio design, and time span  
Country Formal rules for portfolio design Time span 
Austria Law 1970-2015 
Denmark Royal decree 1971-2015 
France Presidential decree 1970-2015 
Germany Organizational decree 1970-2015 
Italy Law 1970-2015 
Netherlands Royal decree 1995-2015 
Norway Royal decree 1970-2015 
Spain Royal decree 1977-2015 
Sweden Royal decree 1982-2015 
Note: In Spain, data collection starts with transition to democracy. In Sweden and the 
Netherlands, the relevant documents to code portfolio design are not readily accessible 
before 1982 and 1995, respectively. 
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Based on these data sources, the country experts identified all changes in portfolio 
design during the period of investigation and provided a short description of the reform 
(Which departments were involved? Which competencies were affected?). In a second 
step, we excluded purely technical reforms and instances with no (or very minor) 
changes in policy jurisdictions. Moreover, consecutive changes within a few days that 
were clearly part of a single process are treated as one reform and dated with the 
earliest available date to capture the starting point of the reform process.6 In total, we 
identified 339 changes in portfolio design in our sample.7 In the supplemental material 
(Appendix A), we describe three randomly selected reforms from our dataset in greater 
detail showing that these changes were substantial and had the potential to affect policy 
processes and outcomes.   
6. Empirical results 
This section presents empirical results on the frequency and timing of portfolio design 
reforms. It shows that the ‘fixed structure’ assumption of an exogenously given design 
of ministerial portfolios is often violated.8 Furthermore, the timing of reforms suggests 
that political motives play a major role. More specifically, we find that changes in 
portfolio design are much more likely after changes in the party composition of the 
cabinet (H1) and the identity of the prime minister (H2), whereas changes in the 
                                                          
6
 For example, single reforms often produce more than one document in France 
because two distinct types of decrees regulate the composition of the cabinet and the 
attribution of policy competencies and administrative capacities to the newly 
appointed ministers. 
7
 A list of all reforms with short descriptions is available at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/BJPolS. 
8
 This article focuses on the frequency of portfolio design changes. For an impression 
of the magnitude and substantive importance of the reforms, we refer readers to the 
supplemental material (Appendix A). 
  17 
cabinet’s ideological position (H3) and its fragmentation (H4) have only weak 
additional effects.  
The frequency of changes in portfolio design 
Table 2 shows the average time (in days) that a given portfolio design is in place across 
countries and over time. The data indicate that the distribution of competencies 
between departments or office holders changes frequently: on average, the portfolio 
design is changed about once a year (mean duration: 387 days). Yet, the frequency 
varies substantially across countries. Reforms occur most often in France, where a 
given design changes (on average) about twice a year (mean duration: 173 days), and 
the Netherlands (mean duration: 211 days). By contrast, changes are most rare in 
Austria, where portfolio designs are (on average) in place for more than two years 
(mean duration: 851 days).  
Table 2: Mean duration (in days) between changes in portfolio design 
Country 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Mean 
Austria 1152.3 901.0 718.0 803.3 851.4 
Denmark 419.3 841.0 733.3 762.2 670.5 
France 168.9 143.6 176.0 198.7 173.2 
Germany 461.0 1071.0 411.1 691.3 610.3 
Italy 310.6 303.3 271.8 304.4 297.0 
Netherlands 
  
262.2 200.8 211.0 
Norway 809.3 574.0 639.5 443.5 543.3 
Spain 640.0 483.6 713.8 951.3 699.3 
Sweden  338.9 315.1 413.0 364.6 
Mean 377.1 400.2 363.0 396.2 386.5 
Note: Reforms from 2011 to 2015 are grouped into the ‘2000s’ category. 
This cross-country variation does not seem to be linked to the second-order rules of 
how portfolio design is changed. In Austria and Italy, changes in the competencies 
  18 
between different departments are regulated by law, which requires approval by a 
parliamentary majority and thus arguably involves more veto players than in countries 
where reforms are possible via decrees.9 However, the two countries differ markedly 
with regard to reform frequency. While portfolio design is in fact rather stable in 
Austria, it changes frequently in Italy. Moreover, there is substantial variation across 
countries that use some sort of decree to change the competencies between different 
departments and office holders.  
There is also no clear time trend in our data beyond some country-specific patterns. 
Changes in portfolio design become more likely over time in Austria and, to a lesser 
extent, in Norway whereas reforms in Denmark were more frequent in the 1970s than 
today. Yet, by and large we see no clear temporal trends that are worth noting.  
Explaining the timing of changes in portfolio design 
This section employs event history analysis to test our hypotheses on the timing of 
reforms. We use Cox proportional hazards models to estimates the ‘hazard rate’, i.e. 
‘the instantaneous probability that an event occurs given that the event has not yet 
occurred’ (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 1427). In our context, the hazard rate 
describes the probability that the portfolio design currently in place is reformed at a 
specific point in time depending on various covariates, most notably the occurrence of 
the four events identified above. As these events can occur at different times during a 
given portfolio design, they are modelled as time-variant covariates. At the beginning 
of each observation (i.e. day 1 of a new portfolio design), the variables for all four 
events have the value ‘0’. After an event (e.g. a change of the prime minister) occurred, 
                                                          
9
 We write ‘primarily’ as not all changes in portfolio design are regulated by law or 
decrees. For example, in Austria, ministers can change the jurisdictions of junior 
ministers within their department without the consent of other political actors.  
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the respective variable takes the value ‘1’ (for dichotomous variables) or the value of 
the magnitude of the change (for continuous variables). To test H1 and H2, we use two 
dichotomous variables that indicate changes in the cabinet’s party composition (H1) 
and the prime ministership (H2). To measure changes in the cabinet’s policy position 
(H3), we calculate the position of each cabinet as the seat share-weighted average of 
cabinet parties’ left-right positions as measured by expert surveys (on a 0-10 scale) 
and then use the absolute difference between the positions of the current cabinet and 
its predecessor. For measuring the change in fragmentation within the cabinet (H4), 
we use the absolute difference in the effective number of cabinet parties from the 
previous to the current cabinet (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).The data on these four 
variables are taken from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2018). 
Beyond these key variables used to test our hypotheses, we also include a time-varying 
covariate that captures the occurrence of general elections. Elections are key turning 
points for parties to change their issue positions and issue emphasis (Walgrave and 
Nuytemans 2009), which could also trigger portfolio design reforms. Election dates 
for legislative and (in France) presidential elections are taken from the Parline 
database of the Inter-parliamentary Union (https://www.ipu.org) and various national 
data archives. 
Furthermore, we include control variables that identify caretaker cabinets, coalition 
cabinets, the formal rules for changing portfolio design, changes in economic 
conditions, and the time period. Caretaker cabinets usually expect only a short tenure 
in office and could thus have a lower probability of portfolio design changes. By 
contrast, reforms should be more frequent under coalitions compared to single-party 
cabinets because the political logic outlined above suggests that parties use portfolio 
design to divide policy jurisdictions among the coalition partners. Data for both 
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variables are taken from the ParlGov database. Third, changes in portfolio design 
could be less likely in countries where such reforms require laws (1) rather than 
decrees (0) because the need for parliamentary approval arguably involves more veto 
players. Fourth, we account for annual changes in the unemployment rate using data 
from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al. 2018). Increasing 
unemployment may point to poor performance of the current institutional setup and 
could trigger changes in portfolio design. Finally, we include dummy variables for 
decades to test whether portfolio design reforms have become more frequent over 
time.10 Overall, we have data on 327 portfolio designs.11 
We test our hypotheses with Cox proportional hazard models. As the four events we 
are interested in are empirically related, we first estimate separate models for each 
event before turning to a full model with all four. Statistical tests show that the crucial 
model assumption of proportional hazards is violated in all model specifications 
(Grambsch and Therneau 1994) and Harrell’s rho tests (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 
2004, 135) are used to identify the variables causing this violation. In each 
specification, the relevant variables are interacted with (the log of) time (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 136–37). Additional robustness tests that include 
country fixed effects to address any remaining country-specific variation yield 
equivalent results (see the supplementary material; Appendix B).  
Table 3 shows that regression results for the five model specifications. Models 1 to 4 
test our four hypotheses separately whereas model 5 includes all variables of interest. 
                                                          
10
 The years from 2011 to 2015 are subsumed in the 2000s dummy variable.  
11
 Observations at the end of the observation period (31 December 2015) are treated 
as right-censored. 
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Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the hazard rate, and thus a higher 
likelihood of a portfolio design change.  
 
Table 3: Analysing the timing of changes in portfolio design 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
∆ Partisan composition of cabinet 1.634***    1.889*** 
 (0.158)    (0.253) 
∆ Prime minister  3.425***   4.125*** 
  (0.848)   (1.041) 
∆ Prime minister X ln(time)  -0.376*   -0.622*** 
  (0.146)   (0.175) 
|Δ Cabinet policy position|   0.294***  -1.477** 
   (0.057)  (0.453) 
|Δ Cabinet policy position| X ln(time)     0.230** 
     (0.076) 
|Δ Effective no of government parties|    0.583*** -0.609** 
    (0.142) (0.207) 
General election  4.654*** 3.955*** 4.459*** 4.639*** 4.748*** 
 (0.887) (0.950) (0.869) (0.851) (0.966) 
General election X ln(time) -0.630*** -0.470** -0.540*** -0.556*** -0.618*** 
 
(0.157) (0.167) (0.153) (0.150) (0.171) 
Caretaker government 0.309 0.326 0.232 0.0517 0.441 
 
(0.293) (0.297) (0.302) (0.298) (0.306) 
Coalition government 0.309* 0.404** 0.446** 0.411** 0.290* 
 (0.136) (0.136) (0.137) (0.137) (0.140) 
Formal rules: law -1.374+ -1.657* -0.0943 -0.0661 -2.922** 
 (0.723) (0.750) (0.142) (0.142) (0.893) 
Formal rules: law X ln(time) 0.207 0.253+   0.438** 
 (0.130) (0.132)   (0.154) 
Time (reference: 1970s)      
1980s 0.0720 -0.0312 -0.142 -0.0713 0.0437 
 (0.201) (0.198) (0.197) (0.199) (0.204) 
1990s -0.0601 -0.134 -0.234 -0.192 -0.0462 
 (0.196) (0.197) (0.195) (0.195) (0.198) 
2000s -0.133 -0.157 -0.284 -0.126 -0.195 
 (0.185) (0.187) (0.189) (0.190) (0.191) 
Change in unemployment rate (in %) 0.160** 0.161** 0.146** 0.163** 0.175*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) 
Observations (Portfolio design regime) 327 327 327 327 327 
Failures (events of interest) 318 318 318 318 318 
Time at risk (in days) 124,417 124,417 124,417 124,417 124,417 
Log Likelihood -1406.4 -1421.3 -1443.3 -1447.4 -1391.4 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Models 1 to 4 support all four hypotheses when tested in isolation – all events have a 
statistically significant positive effect on changes in portfolio design. Yet, hypotheses 
on the magnitude of change (H3 & H4) are largely contingent on changes in the 
cabinet’s party composition (H1). The full model 5 accounts for this interdependence 
by including all four events in a joint model. The results indicate that two event types 
are dominant: Changes in party composition (H1) and changes in the person of the 
prime minister (H2) both have statistically significant and strong positive effects. The 
negative interaction term with time indicates that the positive effect of prime minister 
change on the hazard rate diminishes over time, i.e. new prime ministers primarily 
implement portfolio design reforms early in their tenure. In contrast, we find little 
evidence for additional effects of changes in the cabinet’s ideological position (H3) or 
in its fragmentation (H4). Against our hypotheses, the coefficients of both variables 
are negative and statistically significant albeit, as we show below, substantively weak. 
To interpret these effects in a more meaningful way, we simulate and plot survival 
functions based on results of the full model for different analytically meaningful 
scenarios (Ruhe 2016).12 Putting the remaining covariates at their means (continuous 
variables) and mode (categorical variables)13, the graphs in Figure 1 show the 
probability that a given portfolio design remains in place (‘survives’) over time 
depending on the values of our key covariates. The dashed lines indicate the 
                                                          
12
 The plots of the effects based on Models 1 to 4 are shown in the supplementary 
material (Appendix C). 
13
 Specifically, we model effects for a non-caretaker coalition government in the 
2000s in a country where portfolio design is changed by decrees (rather than laws), 
with a slight increase in unemployment (+0.06 percentage points), and where no 
other events have taken place. Changes in the cabinet’s policy position and 
fragmentation, however, are contingent on changes in the cabinet’s party 
composition. For these covariates, we assume that the party composition of the 
cabinet has changed. 
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probability of portfolio design stability in the aftermath of the four simulated events. 
The solid lines indicate survival functions if the respective event had not occurred.14  
 
Figure 1: Predicted stability of portfolio designs 
 
 
Note: All estimates are based on the Model 5 in Table 3, while the remaining 
covariates are held constant at their mean or mode, respectively. For the (changes in) 
continuous variables, curves show the stability for “no change” (zero; roughly the 
mean) and an increase by one standard deviation. Plots based on the scurve_tvc 
command by Ruhe (2016). 
 
Figure 1 shows that a reform of portfolio design is much more likely after the party 
composition of the government has changed (H1; upper left panel in Figure 1). 
According to the simulation, only about 1 percent of the portfolio designs are still in 
place one year after a change in the party composition, while without such a change 
                                                          
14
 For changes in continuous variables, we plot survival functions for a simulated 
change in the respective variable for ‘no change’ (zero; roughly the mean) and an 
increase by one standard deviation.   
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about 46 percent of portfolio designs remain unchanged. A similar pattern emerges for 
H2 in the upper right panel of Figure 1. When a new prime minister enters office, the 
chances that a given portfolio design remains in place decrease dramatically. One year 
after the event, only about 6 percent of the portfolio designs are still unchanged 
(compared to 46 percent without a change in the identity of the prime minister).  
According to the model, both variables have very strong effects – it is almost certain 
that the portfolio deign is reformed within one year after changes in the cabinet’s party 
composition or the prime ministership. However, this result is not all that surprising in 
light of previous research. Verzichelli (2008) finds that only about one third of all 
cabinets have the same number of ministers as their predecessors. This measure 
underestimates changes in policy responsibilities because it only captures net changes 
(e.g. ignores reforms that create and abolish the same number of ministries) and 
neglects the transfer of policy jurisdictions between ministries. It is therefore not too 
surprising to find even more frequent changes using our more fine-grained data. 
Against our hypotheses, changes in the cabinet’s policy position (H3; lower left panel) 
and fragmentation (H4, lower right panel) decrease the chances of portfolio design 
reform when controlling for partisan and prime ministerial change. However, both 
effects are substantially weak. Changing the cabinet’s policy position by one standard 
deviation (0.8 points on a 0-10 scale) decreases the predicted probability of a reform 
having occurred after one year by roughly 1 percentage point (from 1 to 2 percent). 
The effect of changes in the cabinet’s fragmentation has roughly the same magnitude. 
Thus, the overall assessment of Hypotheses 3 and 4 is ambivalent. While both 
variables have the expected unconditional effects in Models 3 and 4, the full model 
suggests that these findings are due to the simultaneous occurrence of more 
fundamental changes such as a new prime minister and a novel partisan composition 
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of the cabinet. These findings indicate that binary measures of fundamental changes 
are sufficient for explaining reforms in portfolio design whereas gradual measures of 
the magnitude of changes in the cabinet have no additional effects.  
Turning to the control variables, the probability of portfolio design reforms is 
substantially higher after general elections and for coalition governments. Both 
findings are consistent with a political logic in which elections are decisive events and 
the distribution of benefits among multiple cabinet parties is a major driver of reforms. 
The formal rules to change portfolio design (decrees vs. laws) also affect reform 
frequency: portfolio designs that can only be changed by laws are somewhat more 
stable than those that can be altered by decrees. The control variable on caretaker status 
and the decade dummies do not have statistically significant effects. Finally, there is 
evidence that economic performance affects portfolio design change: the probability 
of reform increases with increases in the unemployment rate, which can be interpreted 
as an institutional reaction to performance deficits. 
7. Conclusion 
As the first systematic comparative study of changes in the design of government 
portfolios in Western European democracies, this article provides two core insights. 
First, reforms of portfolio design are frequent (339 cases in nine countries over a period 
of 45 years). This finding casts serious doubt on the standard assumption of coalition 
researchers that ‘the administrative structure of the state changes only very 
occasionally in the real world’ (Laver and Shepsle 1996, 271). Second, these reforms 
occur after political events, most notably changes in the government’s composition in 
terms of parties and the identity of the prime minister. These findings suggest that 
changes in portfolio design follow a political logic that is driven by preference 
alterations among the relevant political actors.  
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Our findings have important implications for the general literature on institutional 
design and for coalition research. For one, the patterns of change are consistent with 
previous research on purposive institutional design showing that reforms of electoral 
systems, parliamentary organization, and political regime types can be explained with 
reference to goals and strategies of political actors. While the timing of reforms 
suggests a political logic for portfolio design as well, timing data cannot provide direct 
evidence for this argument because it does not capture which actors benefit from these 
reforms.  
In future work we seek to explore this question in greater detail. For example, do 
parties use changes in portfolio design to increase their payoffs in the portfolio 
allocation process, either in quantitative terms (e.g. Sieberer 2015; Warwick and 
Druckman 2006) or qualitatively by allocating responsibilities in accordance with 
parties’ substantive priorities (e.g Bäck et al. 2011)? And do government parties 
deliberately allocate policy jurisdictions to different departments to keep tabs on their 
coalition partners on highly divisive issues as research on coalition governance 
suggests (e.g. Carroll and Cox 2012; Martin and Vanberg 2011; Strøm et al. 2008; 
Thies 2001)? These questions point to more specific motivations of why cabinet parties 
seek particular changes in portfolio design. More targeted theoretical models based on 
such motivations yield hypotheses on the conditions under which specific changes 
should occur and on the beneficiaries of such reforms. Obviously, there is much more 
to be done to understand why and how political actors use portfolio design to achieve 
various political goals – and the findings of this article indicate that such analyses 
based on a political logic of portfolio design merit attention in future research.  
Second, the frequency of reforms cast serious doubt on the validity of assuming that 
government portfolios are exogenous to the government formation process as the vast 
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majority of studies on the allocation of government portfolios does (e.g. Bäck et al. 
2011; Carroll and Cox 2007; Ecker et al. 2015; Falcó-Gimeno and Indridason 2013; 
Laver 1998; Laver and Schofield 1990; Verzichelli 2008; Warwick and Druckman 
2006). Our findings suggest that the design of portfolios is not exogenous but should 
be conceptualized as an important outcome of the government formation process. 
Thus, they highlight the need for an integrative analysis of different decisions taken 
during coalition formation. These decisions include the partisan composition of the 
cabinet, its policy program, portfolio allocation, and also portfolio design. Recent work 
has begun to endogenize some aspects such as the choice of formateur that have 
previously been taken as exogenous when explaining portfolio allocation (Bassi 2013; 
Cutler et al. 2016). The findings in this article suggest that the design of cabinet 
portfolios constitutes another dimension we need to consider in moving towards an 
integrative analysis of government formation as a multidimensional bargain (Dewan 
and Hortala-Vallve 2011).  
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Appendix A: The substantive importance of changes in portfolio design 
The distribution of competencies seems to change quite frequently between 
departments and office holders. Yet, the frequency in itself tells little about the 
substantive importance of these changes. To study this aspect in greater detail, we 
describe three randomly selected reforms from our dataset in more detail: Germany in 
November 2005, Denmark in December 2001, and France in May 1974. 
On 22 November 2005, Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) signed an organizational 
decree (BKOrgErl 200515) to reshape the design of several ministries. After the (early) 
elections in September that year, the CDU/CSU entered negotiations with the Social 
Democrats (SPD). Portfolio design was an important aspect of the coalition 
negotiations and the coalition agreement signed on 11 November contained a clause 
according to which major changes in the portfolio design during the legislative period 
would need the agreement of all partners.16 Eleven days later, Angela Merkel was 
elected chancellor and, on her first day in office, signed the organizational decree to 
change the design of ministerial portfolios. 
The decree contains various significant modifications in the design of ministerial 
portfolios. The most significant change was to split the former ‘super ministry’ of 
‘economic affairs and labour’ into two departments. The new (or rather recreated) 
department for ‘labour and social affairs’ gained jurisdiction (from the former ‘super 
ministry’) over labour market policy, unemployment insurance, employment law, and 
occupational safety. It also gained jurisdiction over social insurance, the social code, 
and public assistance programmes from the former department of ‘health and social 
security’ (henceforth only ‘health’). The new (or rather recreated) department of 
‘economic affairs and technology’ got the remaining jurisdictions from the old super 
ministry and gained additional competencies from the departments of finance and of 
‘education and development’ (e.g. transport and space). Two additional ministries 
were renamed, and the head of the chancellor’s office became a minister without 
portfolio (responsible for ‘special affairs’). Importantly, responsibility for migration, 
asylum, and integration was moved from the department for ‘family affairs, senior 
citizens, women and youth’ to a newly established junior minister in the chancellor’s 
                                                          
15
 https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bkorgerl_2005/BJNR319700005.html  
16
 https://www.cdu.de/artikel/gemeinsam-fuer-deutschland-mit-mut-und-
menschlichkeit-koalitionsvertrag-2005  
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office. In sum, the changes in the organizational decree affected eight of the 16 cabinet 
members. 
The Danish reform in December 2001 shares some similarities with the German case. 
The Social Democrats had been in government, but lost the general election in 
November 2001. Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s Venstre became the biggest party in 
parliament and formed a (minority) coalition government with the Conservatives (Det 
Konservative Folkeparti). The new cabinet entered office on 27 November, and about 
one month later, the prime minister signed the Danish royal proclamation BEK 1107 
on 20 December 2001.17 The changes affected the jurisdictions of several ministers. A 
minister for ‘refugees, immigrants and integration’ took over competencies from the 
ministers of the interior (e.g. residence permits), justice (e.g. citizenship), education 
(e.g. language teaching), finance, cities and housing, and social affairs. The department 
for ‘IT and research’ was recast into ‘science, technology and development’ gaining 
responsibilities from the department of education (esp. higher education) and business 
affairs. Two former independent departments (economy and business affairs) were 
merged and jurisdictions over interior and health were fused in a ‘ministry of the 
interior and health’. The ministry of ‘labour’ changed its name to ‘employment’ and 
gained competencies from the department of social affairs (e.g. active employment 
policy). The former department for ‘Cities and Housing’ was abolished and most of its 
jurisdictions were moved to the department of ‘economic and business affairs’. The 
former ministry for ‘environment and energy’ lost many of its key jurisdiction which 
were transferred to the departments of ‘economy & business affairs’ (esp. energy), 
culture (e.g. monument preservation), education (forestry colleges), and foreign affairs 
(e.g. development aid with relation to the environment). In sum, these changes indicate 
a shift in the issue agenda of the newly installed centre-right government. 
The French reform in May 1974 followed the presidential election in that year that 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing won in a close race against François Mitterrand. In an 
attempt to moderate tensions in the Gaullist camp, he nominated Jacques Chirac as 
prime minister on 27 May. The day after, the ‘decret du 28 mai 1974 portant 
nomination des membres du government’ was published.18 The reform contained in 
                                                          
17
 https://www.retsinformation.dk/Forms/R0710.aspx?id=20966  
18
 
http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/all/ve/pdf/jo_giscard_gvt_chirac_29mai74_9juin7
4.pdf  
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the decree affected several ministries. The jurisdiction over ‘industry, trade, and 
handwork’ was split into two ministries (‘ministry of industry’ & ‘ministry of trade 
and handwork’). The ministries for ‘post and telecommunication’ and ‘cultural affairs 
and environment’ were dissolved and the jurisdictions transferred to state secretaries 
subordinate to ministers or the prime minister. In turn, new ministries for 
‘cooperation’, ‘reforms’, and ‘external trade’ were created.  
In sum, all three reforms are examples of substantively important reforms in portfolio 
designs: ministries were merged, split, created, or abandoned. Many jurisdictions were 
moved between departments, and the changes affected several departments and/or 
office holders. These changes are certainly more than just cosmetics – they signal the 
designated policy change of governments (e.g. the migration ministry in Denmark) 
and how policies are framed (e.g. energy as an environmental or an economic issue).  
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Appendix B: Results including country fixed effects 
Table B.1: Analysing the timing of changes in portfolio design 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
∆ Partisan composition of cabinet 1.753***    1.588*** 
 (0.167)    (0.246) 
∆ Prime minister  3.821***   4.084*** 
  (0.872)   (1.053) 
∆ Prime minister X ln(time)  -0.409**   -0.591** 
  (0.151)   (0.180) 
|Δ Cabinet policy position|   0.380***  -0.959* 
   (0.061)  (0.448) 
|Δ Cabinet policy position| X ln(time)     0.163* 
     (0.076) 
|Δ Effective no of government parties|    0.788*** -0.446* 
    (0.155) (0.215) 
General election  3.618*** 3.165*** 3.459*** 3.459*** 3.558*** 
 (0.886) (0.912) (0.859) (0.855) (0.952) 
General election X ln(time) -0.403* -0.289+ -0.326* -0.318* -0.385* 
 
(0.159) (0.163) (0.154) (0.153) (0.170) 
Caretaker government -0.189 -0.248 -0.384 -0.515 -0.101 
 
(0.330) (0.335) (0.338) (0.332) (0.338) 
Coalition government -0.208 -0.146 -0.0728 -0.101 -0.206 
 (0.169) (0.169) (0.169) (0.170) (0.171) 
Formal rules: law -1.253 -1.643 -0.744* -0.660+ -2.687* 
 (0.946) (1.000) (0.332) (0.340) (1.129) 
Formal rules: law X ln(time) 0.0899 0.153   0.305+ 
 (0.145) (0.152)   (0.171) 
Time (reference: 1970s)      
1980s 0.126 0.0438 -0.0327 0.0771 0.0902 
 (0.203) (0.200) (0.199) (0.200) (0.206) 
1990s 0.0923 0.0497 -0.0340 0.0267 0.0712 
 (0.200) (0.201) (0.201) (0.200) (0.202) 
2000s 0.0148 0.0939 -0.0356 0.163 -0.0282 
 (0.192) (0.193) (0.198) (0.197) (0.198) 
Change in unemployment rate (in %) 0.202*** 0.211*** 0.189** 0.208*** 0.220*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.055) (0.056) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations (Portfolio design regime) 327 327 327 327 327 
Failures (events of interest) 318 318 318 318 318 
Time at risk (in days) 124,417 124,417 124,417 124,417 124,417 
Log Likelihood -1343.5 -1354.9 -1377.3 -1382.6 -1332.8 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; Country fixed effects not reported. 
+
 p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Figure B.1: Predicted stability of portfolio designs 
 
Note: All estimates are based on Model 5 in Table B.1, while the remaining covariates 
are held constant at their mean or mode, respectively. For the (changes in) continuous 
variables, curves show the stability for “no change” (zero; roughly the mean) and an 
increase by one standard deviation. Plots based on the scurve_tvc command by Ruhe 
(2016). 
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Appendix C: Testing Hypotheses 1 to 4 in separate models 
Figure C.1: Predicted stability of portfolio designs 
 
Note: Estimates based on Models 1 to 4 in Table 3 in the article, respectively. The 
remaining covariates are held constant at their mean or mode, respectively. For the 
(changes in) continuous variable, curves show the stability for “no change” (zero; 
roughly the mean) and an increase by one standard deviation. Plots based on the 
scurve_tvc command by Ruhe (2016). 
 
 
 
